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                                                              ABSTRACT 
 
 
Identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol(IBAKE) with perfect forward 
security(PFS) is one of the major advancement in the field of cryptography. This protocol is 
used to establish secure communication between two parties who are provided with their own 
unique identities, by establishing their common secret keys without the need of sending and 
verifying their public key certificates. This scheme involves a key generation centre(KGC) 
which would provide the two parties involved, with their static key that can be authenticated 
by the parties. 
 
 Our protocol can be viewed as a variant of the protocol proposed by Xie et al. in 2012 [8]. 
Our protocol does not rely on bilinear pairings. We have made a comparative study of the 
existing protocol and the proposed protocol and proved that our protocol is more efficient. 
We have also provided enough proofs to verfy that our protocol is secure under attacks and is 
not forgeable. 
 
Keywords: IBAKE (Identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol), PFS (perfect 
forward security), KGC (key generation center), static key. 
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                                            CHAPTER 1 
                   
                                   INTRODUCTION 
                                         
Communication in a public network needs a secure connection between the parties involved. 
One of the most important cryptographic methodologies that aid such a communication is the 
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol. The parties communicate by establishing a 
secure common session key. Identity-Based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol 
enables to have a secure communication where parties use their identities, such as, phone 
numbers, e-mail addresses to establish their common secret keys. The major advantage of 
IBAKE is that the parties need not send their public key certificates. 
 
Research work done so far on IBAKE [1,2,3,4,5] protocol are computationally efficient but 
most of the protocols do not provide perfect forward security (PFS) [6] which is one of the 
most desirable and important property of the AKE protocol. Some protocols provide PFS but 
are restricted to work on much larger groups. 
 
In this thesis, we propose an IBAKE protocol without bilinear pairings which is secure with 
PFS under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model.  
We have chosen the Schnorr-like signature scheme as the base for the construction of the 
protocol. The protocol can be applied on any cyclic group in which the Diffie-Hellman 
problem is considered to be hard. This protocol is a combination of a secure IBAKE protocol 
having a secure ID-based signature scheme. 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we discussed the literature covering all the 
significant research in this area. The construction of the protocol is discussed in chapter 3. 
The proposed scheme is discussed in Chapter 4. The implementation details of the above 
scheme are given in Chapter 5. The results and observations are given in chapter 6.The future 
scope and conclusion is presented in Chapter 7.  
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                                            CHAPTER 2 
 
                                  LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1. Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of secret writing. Encryption and Decryption are the two 
processes involved in cryptography. The ordinary text is known as the plain text. The plain 
text is encrypted is called cipher text. The process of converting plain text into cipher text is 
known as encryption. The process of converting a cipher text back to the original plain text is 
known as decryption. There are three techniques of encryption and decryption- Symmetric 
cryptography, Asymmetric cryptography and Hashing [9, 10].  
 
 
2.1.1. Symmetric key cryptography: 
 
In this type, the secret key is common for encryption and decryption. The signer and 
requester use the same key by sharing it via a communication channel .The sender locks the 
plain text using the shared secret key, the plain text is converted into the cipher text and is 
sent to the receiver. The receiver receives the cipher text, converts it to the plain text using 
the common secret key [9, 10]. 
 
2.1.2. Asymmetric key cryptography: 
In this, there are two keys involved- private key and public key. The public key is known to 
all the other communicating parties. The private key is secret to one party only. The sender 
sends the information by encrypting it using the public key of the receiver and the receiver 
uses its own private key to decrypt it and vice versa. This type of encryption is very widely 
used since it has a lot of advantages [9, 10]. 
 
 
2.1.3. Hashing: 
Hashing is a way of converting a variable length input into a fixed length output. It uses a 
cryptographic hash function to perform its function. Every hash function should have three 
properties- pre image resistance, second pre image resistance and collision resistance [9,10] 
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2.2. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange  
 
The method of exchanging keys over an insecure channel (public channel) is known as 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It is a very old and popular method of public key exchange 
that was implemented and used. The Diffie–Hellman key exchange helps two communicating 
parties to communicate via a common secret key that is shared between them through an 
insecure channel. Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman invented this scheme in 1976.  
Although Diffie–Hellman key agreement helps in authenticated key exchange though it is 
itself non-authenticated, and it provides perfect forward secrecy in the transport layer using 
ephemeral keys (referred to as EDH or DHE depending on the cipher suite) [14]. 
 
Cryptographic explanation: 
  
This protocol is implemented over a multiplicative group of integers, where p is prime, and 
g is a primitive root modulo p.  The steps are: 
 
1) Alice and Bob are supposed to choose a prime number p and a base generator g . 
 
2) Alice chooses a secret integer a and computes A= gamodp and sends A to Bob. 
 
3) Bob chooses a secret integer b and computes B= gbmodp and sends B to Alice. 
 
4) Alice computes s= Bamodp 
 
5) Bob computes s’= Abmodp 
 
s and s’ have the same computed output since-  
 
g
ab
modp = g
ba
modp. 
 
 
All parameters except a and b are public. Once the common secret key is established 
Alice and Bob use this shared key for encryption and can send and receive messages 
over any insecure channel. 
 
2.3. One Round Identity-Based Key Exchange  
One round Identity based key exchange uses the identity parameters of a user, such as email 
addresses or phone numbers, for encryption and signature verification. This feature reduces 
the complexity since there is no need of sending and verifying public key certificates [9, 10]. 
It involves a private key generator or the key generation centre which generates the master 
public key and master private key before any operation. 
The process of encryption and decryption proceeds as follows:  
4  
 
1)  Alice generates the plaintext P. She uses Bob's identity IDBob and the KGC's public 
key pkKGC to encrypt P, generating cipher text C. Alice sends C to Bob. IDBob and 
pkGGC were public parameters and were already known to Alice, even before the 
starting of the encryption process and so there is no need of prior preparation of Bob 
to communicate the keys to Alice for communication. 
2)  Bob receives the cipher text C from Alice. It is assumed in most of the cases that C 
comes with a set of plaintext instructions to contact the KGC to get the private key 
required for decryption. Bob sends sufficient proof to KGC to authenticate itself with 
the KGC that IDBob belongs to him, on receiving which the KGC sends Bob's private 
key skIDBob to him over a secure channel. If IDBob were based on an email address, 
for example, the KGC sends a nonce to this email address, the successful return of 
which might provide an acceptable level of assurance that the owner of IDBob was 
the one who had contacted the KGC. This nonce can be returned through a SSL 
hypertext join which gave Bob a protected connection for downloading his private 
key. For a larger amount of certification, Bob could be obliged to present his 
certifications in individual and get a conservative circle containing skIDBob. 
3)  Bob uses his  private key skIDBob to decrypt the cipher text C and recover plaintext 
message P. 
2.4. Perfect Forward Security  
Perfect Forward Secrecy is a feature in which if by any chance the private key of the server is 
compromised then also the session key generated is not compromised This is achieved by 
generating unique session keys for every session that is initiated. The main advantage us that 
even if the session key of the current session is compromised then the data that is exchanged 
in that session might be compromised but the subsequent sessions use different keys so that 
information exchange is still secure. 
With Perfect Forward Secrecy, for each session a new set of Diffie-Hellman parameters are 
generated and both communicating parties create a new shared secret key that is unique and 
hidden from any attacker. [13]. 
2.5. Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption  
In a cyclic group, a certain computational problem is hard. This is implid by the 
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH assumption).  
Considering a cyclic group G of order q. According to the CDH assumption that if we are 
given  for a generator g that is randomly choosen and random  
  it is not possible to compute in polynomial time the value-   g
ab
 
[11]. 
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                                                CHAPTER 3 
 
                                             PRELIMINARY 
 
The schnorr-like signature scheme is the basis of our protocol. In this section we discuss the 
schnorr-like signature in detail [7]. 
3.1. Schnorr-like signature scheme  
This includes four algorithms: 
1) Generation of global parameters: 
-Input: k  (a secure parameter selected randomly) 
-Output:  
a) Master secret key (MSK) = z  
   where z  is a random element from qZ  
b) Master public key (MPK) = ( ', , , , ,zG g q g H H  ) 
   where G  = generation algorithm 
             H’:{0,1}*-> 
qZ  
                  H:{0,1}
*
-> 
qZ  
 
2) Key-extraction algorithm: 
 - Input: MSK, MPK and  ID of the user 
  -Output: a) static key modkIDr g p  = ( y  , 
rg
 
) where r is a random element from  
qZ  
                b) . ( , )rY r z H g ID   
 
3) The signing algorithm: 
 - Input: MPK, IDs , message m 
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 -Output: signature ( , , )a rS g b g  
 where a  is a random element from Zq  
 '. ( , , )ab a y H ID g m   
4) Verification algorithm: 
-Input: MPK, S , m, ID 
-Output: ( )b a r zc dg g g g ,  the output shows if this equation is true or not  
  where     ( , )rC H g ID   
                '( , , )ad H ID g m  
This scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message and 
adaptive identity attacks under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle 
model [7]. 
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                                                                             CHAPTER 4 
                 
                     THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
4.1. The Proposed Scheme: 
The following are the major changes that in the existing scheme [8] in order to propose our 
new scheme: 
1) Use of a single hash function. 
2) The computation of IDs . 
3) Verification of the received static key by the KGC. 
4) In the protocol running, the computation of the signature and the verification has also 
been modified. 
5) The number of exponentiation has been reduced in case of the verification algorithm. 
The proposed scheme consists of three participants, namely, KGC, signer and requester. We 
used five modules: Mater public key generation, public key generation, static key generation, 
verification of static key, key exchange. Each module is described as below. 
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                                              CHAPTER 5 
                      
           IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
5.1. Details regarding Implementation: 
 Language used: Java 
 Hash Function: SHA-1 
 Number of users communicating: 2 
 Static key is generated by the module “static key generation” 
 Running environment: my eclipse 
 Operating system: windows 7(64 bit) 
 RAM specification: 4GB 
 
Master public key generation: 
Values of Parameters: g=2, w=31, p=97 
Public key Generation: 
In this module we generate the private keys for A an B (the two users who are 
communicating). 
Values of Parameters: xa (private key of A) = 54, xb (private key of B) = 65, g=2 , p=97 
Static key generation: 
The static key ( , )ID ID IDt s r  is calculated using the following parameters as input: 
ak =23, Identity of A=12  
bk =67, Identity of B=14 
   Static Key Verification: 
  The user can authenticate the static key generated by the KGC. The value of authentication 
is calculated using equation- ( ,( . ) mod )userID xrID IDS H ID r W p  and output is shown in the 
snapshot of implementation. 
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  Key Exchange protocol: 
Value of parameters: 27Bk   
'AS   and 'BS  are calculated using - 
''
'
''
'
( , ( . ) mod )
( . mod ) mod
( , mod )
axr
A B b
B B
S
B a
S H ID r y p
S k r x p p
S H ID y p

 

 respectively. 
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5.2. Snapshot of the implementation: 
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                                               CHAPTER 6 
 
                             RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
 
6.1. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we first show the security assumptions of the proposed scheme. Then we 
discuss the correctness of the scheme. 
1) The proposed scheme satisfies unforgeable property 
In order to forge the static key, the adversary has to know the values of ka, kb. To forge 
the signature, xa and xb are required. All these values are protected under the DLP 
assumption. 
2)  The authenticity of the static key obtained by a communicating party can be verified 
using ( ,( . ) mod )userID xrID IDS H ID r W p   
 
Proof: 
                                       
( . )
'
'
( . )
.
( , mod )
.
.
( . )
user
ID
k w rID
user
user ID user
ID
user user
userID
s
ID user
xs
user
k w r
user
x
kx w r x
x r x
ID
xr
ID
s H ID y p
y g
y
g
g g
r w
r w








  
3) The signature can be verified using (8) which is indeed correct. 
Proof: 
 
                                        
"
( )"
( ) .( )
( ) .( )
( . )
B B
A B B
A B A B
B A B A
A A
A
k rxs
a a
x k rxs
a
x k rx x
k x x rx
x rx
B B
xr
B B
y y
y g
g
g g
r y
r y








  
 
4) Security of the protocol under PFS(Perfect Forward Security): 
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Case 1: When ar  and br  are known to the adversary: 
Proof:  If an adversary gets to know the Ar  and Br  of one session, for the next session 
new values of  
Ar   and Br   are calculated as- 
mod
mod
a
b
k
A
k
B
r g p
r g p


 
Where ka  and kb are randomly selected and both belong to Zq
*
. 
Thus, the adversary can never use the known values of Ar   and Br in the next session 
and thus all the sessions are secure.  
 
Case 2:  When ax  or bx  is known to the adversary: 
Proof:  In our protocol we calculate SA
’
 as-  
' ( ,( . ) mod )a
xr
A B bS H ID r y p  
Even if the private keys are known to the adversary, the adversary would still need the 
value of  r to get SA
’ 
. For each session r is calculated as-  
. modA Br r r p  
Thus knowing xa would not reveal the session-key. 
 
We observe from case 1 and case 2 that the shared secret key (SA
’
, SB
’
) is not transmitted and 
both are calculated at each end separately. We can thus say that our protocol provides perfect 
forward security. 
 
 
6.2. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We compared the performance of the proposed scheme with the existing one [8] considering 
the number of exponentiations and the result is shown in the following table- 
 
 #E-e #E-sk #E-S #E-V PFS 
MIBE 
protocol 
1 2 1 3 YES 
Proposed 
protocol 
1 2 2 1 YES 
 
#E-e and #E-sk stand for the number of exponentiations done for ephemeral key and static 
key respectively. #E-S and #E-V stand for the number of exponentiations done for the 
signing and verifying.   
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It is observed from the table that in case of MIBE protocol the number of exponentiations 
done for verification is 3 while that of the proposed protocol is only 1. 
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                                                                            CHAPTER 7 
 
                             FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, we proposed a modified IBAKE scheme that allows two parties to 
communicate without sending and verifying their public key certificates. The proposed 
protocol has been proved to be unforgeable and is also secure against attacks such as chosen 
cipher text attack. The scheme also provides perfect forward security which makes this 
protocol secure and efficient. The proposed protocol is computationally cost effective.  
The proposed protocol can be successfully implemented in an electronic communication 
which involves two parties. This protocol can be implemented in a micro-payment scheme 
where the protocol would aid to authenticate the customer and the merchant before any 
transaction occurs. 
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